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The U.S. Department of Justice recently concluded its investigation into the role that the 
credit rating agency, Moody’s, had played in contributing to the Financial Crisis of 2007/08. 
The size of the financial-based penalty was to be expected because, as mentioned in a 
previous article, the extent of evidence that could have been gathered against Moody’s, as 
opposed to the evidence gathered against Standard & Poor’s in a similar investigation in 
2015, was going to be smaller due to the record-keeping policies of Moody’s. Yet, what is of 
interest is the remarkable statement of facts that Moody’s have acknowledged, and the 
compliance provisions that the Department of Justice are promoting as being a victory for 
investors and the public at large. In this article we will see that the result of these 
investigations is that the top two agencies have emerged relatively unscathed, and that they 
are primed to take advantage of their position again when regulatory amnesia takes hold. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In a previous article, I had discussed the investigation of the Department of Justice (DoJ) into 
Standard & Poor’s conduct regarding the Financial Crisis of 2007/08 and had suggested that, 
given that S&P were fined a record $1.375 billion, it would set an awful precedent if 
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Moody’s was to escape the same fate1. The divergence regarding possible differences in 
punishment existed because of the record-keeping policies of Moody’s in comparison to 
S&P. However, whilst the DoJ have punished Moody’s, and also in an expected fashion i.e. a 
smaller financial penalty, the content of the conclusion of the investigation is remarkable and 
is the focus of this article. After analysing the report itself, it will be suggested that the 
agencies are in a much different position now than they were before S&P settled with the DoJ 
two years ago – unfortunately, that position is a favourable one for them and a particularly 
perilous one for the public. 
 
The Settlement 
 
The DoJ was always expected to settle with Moody’s, and settle for an amount much smaller 
than the one agreed with S&P in its first post-Crisis investigation into the conduct of the 
Ratings Industry2. Announcing on January 13th 2017, the DoJ declared that it had secured 
nearly $864 million on behalf of itself and a number of U.S. states3, which represents over 
half of what was agreed with S&P two years earlier. However, the content of the settlement is 
telling. The Principal Deputy Associate Attorney General Bill Baer proclaimed that: 
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‘Today’s settlement contains not only a significant penalty and factual admission of 
its conduct, but also a commitment by Moody’s to new and continued compliance 
measures designed to ensure the integrity of credit ratings going forward’4. 
 
There are two elements which stand out. Firstly, getting the rating agencies to admit to any 
wrongdoing is an extraordinary achievement in itself5. Secondly, the commitment to a ‘new’ 
standard of compliance has all the ‘buzzwords’ one would want, but actually reading what 
those standards are cultivate a very different feeling. With regards to the Statement of Facts 
that Moody’s agrees to, there are persistent themes which deserve attention. 
 
Within the Statement of Facts included in the DoJ’s announcement, Moody’s admitted that it 
had published a ‘Code of Professional Conduct’ which included how it would manage any 
conflicts of interest. This document alone, published and available to all, is designed to 
demonstrate to investors (and the public moreover) why the agency can be trusted. As part of 
this mission, Moody’s is keen to promote the ideal that the profit-concerned and rating-
concerned elements of the business are effectively separated, ultimately suggesting that the 
ratings produced by analysts are independent of the success of the agency. However, here 
Moody’s admits that rather than this ‘firewall’ being in place, the practice was actually to ask 
Managing Directors to resolve the ‘dilemma’ between maintaining ratings quality and 
winning business from the issuers who selected them – the result of this delegation of 
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responsibility needs no further analysis; asking people whose future depends upon the 
success of the firm to act ethically, rather than instilling a culture of ethical practice, is an 
extraordinary departure from responsibility by the leading figures of the Agency. 
 
The Statement of Facts continues by showing the nascent development of a practice that 
would continue long after the Financial Crisis, and that is reporting rating methodology, and 
then consciously departing from that so that the issuer is aware of the departure but not the 
investors6. Going back as far as 2001, Moody’s acknowledged that they promoted the idea 
that their ratings addressed the expected credit loss an investor may incur via the 
measurement of the ‘probability of default’ and the ‘loss given default’ on any rated 
securities. However, they then used an analytical tool that only applied those parameters to 
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities rated Aaa, and not below. Instead, the tool meant 
that these parameters were ‘replicated’ to securities of a lower quality, thus inflating their 
creditworthiness – the investors were not aware of this, but issuers were. To talk plainly for 
one moment, we have here an absolutely scandalous revelation that Moody’s were applying 
Aaa standards to lesser-quality issuances whilst informing the public that they were rating all 
securities in an independent manner. The Agency concludes its Statement of Facts by 
admitting that from 2004 onwards, it did not follow its publicised idealised expected loss 
standards but instead initiated a ‘lenient’ approach to the rating of all Aaa Collateralised Debt 
Obligations (a key component of the pre-Crisis structured finance market) – this is crucial 
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because many investors were bound by regulations to only invest in Aaa securities. The 
Agency finish by acknowledging that issuers knew of this leniency, but investors did not. 
 
The Statement of Facts paints a remarkable picture. It shows, as admitted by the Agency 
themselves, that they consciously sided with issuers of structured finance products who. Lest 
we forget, pay the agencies for their services, against investors. Not only did they act against 
investors, but they actively acted against the interests of investors, by publishing information 
that they knew would be relied upon. A question will be raised at the end of this article but it 
is worth foreshadowing it here: it is arguably amazing that this Statement of Facts is not 
being used to initiate Criminal proceedings against the controllers of the Agency (irrespective 
of the conclusive nature of the settlement). Yet, these iniquities within the ratings industry are 
well known and should not shock or surprise. It is the so-called ‘compliance commitments’, 
however, which may leave one incredulous. 
 
The announcement by the DoJ is very forthcoming in displaying the compliance agreement it 
has reached with Moody’s. The announcement states that Moody’s ‘agrees to maintain a host 
of measures designed to ensure the integrity of its credit ratings’ which include: the 
separation of its commercial and credit rating functions; independent review of its 
methodologies and alterations; ‘changes to ensure that specified personnel are not 
compensated on the basis of the company’s financial performance’; and increasing the 
timeliness of press releases, and their accuracy – there were a number of others besides as 
well. What can we take from this? Well, we can do one of two things. If we focus upon the 
sentiment of the announcement, we can conclude that Moody’s has been reprimanded and is 
now seeking to address the issues that caused the transgressions because, as Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General Jonathan Olin suggests, the DoJ is ‘committed to working with companies 
that are willing to admit to what they did and take steps to enhance compliance’. This is an 
accepting and forgiving narrative. Or, on the other hand, we can be enraged, disappointed, 
and emboldened in our belief that the law applies differently to large corporations. This 
announcement, as a whole, can be read in a number of ways, yet there is one reading that 
stands out. What we have here is an account which details that Moody’s lied to investors and 
actively worked against them, followed by the championing of an agreement that proclaims 
that Moody’s will now do what they have said they have been doing for the past two decades. 
Moody’s, along with S&P, are quick to advertise their ethical and compliant approaches, but 
admit that they do not follow them; the response from the U.S. Government has been to 
‘agree’ with the agencies that they will try to follow them from now on. This settlement, 
which was supposed to champion the position of the Government as protector of the investor, 
and the public moreover, has had the opposite effect – it has highlighted their predisposition 
for supporting the corporation above the public. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The settlement between Moody’s and the DoJ has concluded the punishment of the Big Two 
rating agencies for their conduct in the lead-up to the Financial Crisis. Combined, the 
agencies have been fined just over $2.2 billion, which is a headline-grabbing figure. But, if 
we look at it critically, it is almost an irrelative sum. The rating agencies, as a result of their 
involvement in the sub-prime debacle, have posted year-on-year growth for the past 14 years 
(disregarding 2007 and 2008) according to their official reports, and have become even more 
engrained into the fabric of the interconnected global economy. As a punishment, the U.S. 
Government has decided that a fine, which represents a fraction of their profits from the 
period, together with a pledge that the agencies will act as they have proclaimed for over two 
decades, represents a positive outcome. Well, it does not. It actually represents two things. 
Firstly, it represents the dynamic between the Government, the Private Sector, and the Public. 
The Government, in a similar modus operandi to that of the agencies, says one thing and does 
another – it is continuing to prove that it serves to facilitate private enterprise, rather than 
protect the public from the iniquities of the marketplace. Secondly, and perhaps most 
importantly, it highlights the hazardous situation we are in. Recently, newly-elected U.S. 
President Donald Trump has begun proceedings to repeal elements, or even perhaps all, of 
the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, an Act which was designed to protect the public from Wall 
Street7. Now, when this is understood alongside the extraordinarily-lenient punishment of the 
top two rating agencies, only one thing can be deduced – the potential for a regulatory-
inspired bubble is rapidly increasing. The rating agencies, bloated with profit from the last 
bubble, will be willing participants in any financial bubble, particularly now they know the 
punishment will never fit the crime. The question to be asked, however, is a pertinent and 
daunting one: there was over 70 years between the Great Depression and the Great 
Recession; is society capable of coping with another financially-based attack upon it so soon 
after 2007/08? This article suggests that it is not, and that the recent ‘punishment’ by the DoJ 
can go a long way to ensuring that that question gets answered. 
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